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Resumen
En este artículo paso revista a la evolución de la agenda de seguridad 
Mexico-Estados Unidos desde que la relación entre ambos países se nor-
malizó completamente, tomando la identidad estatal post-revolucionaria, 
el Nacionalismo Revolucionario, como la variable explicativa clave el 
proceso. En la primera sección conjeturo acerca de la construcción de la 
identidad y sus múltiples significados. En la segunda, analizo la identi-
dad estatal post-revolucionaria como la base sobre la cual se estableció 
la relación de seguridad con su vecino del norte. En las siguientes tres 
secciones me centro en tres casos: la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la Cuba 
Comunista, y el tráfico de estupefacientes. Conforme la identidad de 
Mexico ha evolucionado, una especie de «seguridad en partes» parece 
estar emergiendo en esta díada norteamericana. 
Palabras clave: Mexico, Estados Unidos, seguridad, idea del Hemisferio 
Occidental, Iniciativa Mérida
Abstract
I review the evolution of the U.S.-Mexico security agenda since the rela-
tionship between the two countries became fully normalized, taking the 
post-revolutionary state identity, Revolutionary Nationalism, as the key 
explanatory factor in the process. In the first section I elaborate on the 
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construction of identity and its multifaceted meanings. The second looks 
at Mexico’s post-revolutionary identity as the bedrock of the country’s 
security relationship with its northern neighbour. In the following three 
I look at three cases: World War II, Communist Cuba, and drug traf-
ficking. As Mexico’s identity as evolved, a sort of ‘security in parts’ in 
this North American dyad seems to be emerging.
Keywords: Mexico, United States, security, identity, Western Hemi-
sphere Idea, Mérida Initiative
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Mexico’s security relationship with 
the United States has historically 
been characterised by distance—geo-
graphical contiguity between the two 
countries notwithstanding. But it was 
precisely this proximity, or rather the 
opportunity this closeness meant for 
the stronger party to take over part of 
the weaker one’s territory in the nine-
teenth century, which set the tone for 
the distal approach on security affairs 
during most of the twentieth century. I 
say during most of the twentieth cen-
tury because during the last years of 
the Porfirio Díaz regime (1876-1910) 
there was a rapprochement on security 
matters.1 However, over the last century 
there was one particular event of an 
internal nature that would go farther 
in explaining Mexico’s resilient attitude 
in security affairs toward its northern 
neighbour: the 1910-1920 revolution.
The Revolution created a new sense 
of national purpose and state identity, 
and with it a new understanding of its 
sovereignty. The post-revolutionary 
identity’s defining characteristic as it 
regards the outside world, and particu-
larly the U.S., was keeping the northern 
neighbour at arms length—except in 
critical times—in order to protect its 
sovereignty. Thus, during World War II 
(WWII) there was bilateral cooperation 
on security matters —but even then 
Mexico’s was rather aloof. After the 
extra-continental threat disappeared, so 
1 As in the 1907 peace treaty —conven-
tion— regarding Central America and in 
the sending of Mexican military personnel 
for training in US academies.
did Mexico’s cooperation with Wash-
ington on security affairs. However, 
there were also some lesser threats, 
both to US interests and particularly to 
the post-revolutionary political regime, 
which made cooperation possible. In 
these matters, such as the perceived ‘Cu-
ban Communist threat’, Mexico City 
and Washington shared a basic interest 
and, accordingly, cooperated—even if 
this was done in a most subdued fash-
ion. Of a different, and at the same time 
more complex and fundamental nature, 
drug trafficking became a central con-
cern (first due to US pressure and later 
chiefly to the threat it represented inter-
nally) of the bilateral security agenda. It 
would actually be this composite item 
in the bilateral security agenda, as crys-
tallised in the 2007 Mérida Initiative, 
that would lead to what might amount 
to a novel understanding of Mexico’s 
security relationship with its northern 
neighbour.
In this article I review the evolution 
of the U.S.-Mexico security agenda 
since the relationship between the two 
countries became fully normalised, 
in the 1940s, taking the post-revolu-
tionary state identity, Revolutionary 
Nationalism, as the key explanatory 
factor in the process. The first section 
is mostly analytical; in it, I elaborate 
on the construction of identity and its 
multifaceted meanings. In the second, 
taking a more historical stance, I look at 
Mexico’s post-revolutionary identity as 
the bedrock of the country’s security re-
lationship with its northern neighbour. 
In the following three sections I look 
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at the above mentioned cases: WWII, 
Communist Cuba, and drug trafficking, 
in that order. While discrete, as a whole 
the three cases point to the broader 
context that has served as the founda-
tion for the sporadic bilateral coopera-
tion on security matters. Resting on a 
minimalist common understanding of 
security, whilst Mexico’s Revolutionary 
Nationalism as state identity unfolded, 
various elements seem to have started 
adding up—and the construction of a 
‘security in parts’ in this North-Ameri-
can dyad seems to be emerging.
Sovereignty as Identity
It has commonly been observed that 
the modern state system is a bifurcate 
one. It is composed of international 
ordering principles on the one hand, 
and of distinctive political units on the 
other. The divide, however, is not clear-
cut. Thus, for instance, one of the sys-
tem’s ordering principles, sovereignty, is 
shot through and through by unit-level 
features. It is a structural intervening 
variable whose content, at the state lev-
el, is filled by the projection of domestic 
purpose. Since sovereignty is an inter-
nationally recognised status, it is only 
logical that states seek to imbue it with 
their national object. It is not that the 
principle as such is directly concerned 
with it, that is, with the individuality 
of the states, but rather that it sets the 
stage for them to provide its content 
while ‘doing’ their sovereignty (Werner 
and De Wilde 2001, 297; Wendt 1999, 
182-183; McSweeney 1999, 165).Thus, 
states’ patterns of authority and culture 
produce a particular sovereign-identity 
that is in turn projected onto the inter-
national system.
Identity as a social category contains 
two dimensions, which vary with time: 
its content and the degree to which it 
is contested. The purpose of the collec-
tivity, its worldview, is part of the first 
dimension. The second refers to the 
extent to which the content of identity 
is accepted by members of the group 
(Abdelal et al. 2006, 696). Whereas the 
contentious nature of identity points to 
its fluidity, its substantive component 
directs us in the opposite direction: 
its (relative) permanence. Once estab-
lished, identity creates interests and lim-
its the range of choice—not ‘everything 
goes with a given identity (Katzenstein 
1996, 30).2 This is not to suggest that 
only one, overarching identity exists—
state identities often vary according to 
the issue area in question. However, not 
all identities carry the same weight nor 
have the same endurance. Some  have a 
greater prominence and resilience than 
others—and changing these identities, 
like altering any tradition or customary 
practice,  is not easily done(Legro 2009, 
44). But even these heavier, more salient 
identities do change—and it is easier to 
grasp this mutation by disaggregating 
2 To say that identity stands analytically 
apart from interests and that on many 
occasions precedes them is not to postu-
late a clear-cut division between them, or 
to privilege an ethereal concept over a 
more «concrete» one. 
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them, as I do here with regard to the 
security component of Mexico’s sover-
eign identity vis-à-vis the United States.
The multifaceted practice of sover-
eignty endows the term with multiple 
meanings, depending on time and 
context. Thus, for instance, whereas 
‘economic sovereignty’ has been crucial 
for some countries in some periods, 
it has ceased being considered so in 
others. To a large extent, the multivo-
cal and changing understanding of 
sovereignty ows to its being part of 
a bipartite normative structure. The 
twofold nature of international poli-
tics thus points to the one important 
element: identity is constructed on two 
fronts (McSweeney 1999, 160). That 
is, states’ identities are contested and 
defined by political processes taking 
place both inside their borders—by 
the contestation among sub-national 
groups—and outside—by the interac-
tion states have with other states and 
other actors in the international arena. 
Hence, the successful construction of 
sovereignty requires achieving cohe-
sion internally and distinctiveness and 
respect internationally—an eminently 
political process (Subotic 2011, 312; 
Kowert 2007, 5; Werner 2001, 308).
Moreover, identity is relational. Self-
definition depends in part on others, to 
whom the self is constantly contrasting 
and comparing (Smith 1998, 181). 
However, ‘others’ are not static, nor do 
actors have ‘objective’ knowledge about 
them. Hence, one’s understanding of 
others is predicated not only on the mo-
ment a specific interaction takes place, 
but also on both the historical baggage 
of the relationship and the perception 
of self in the mirror of others.
That is why not only identity, but 
also the construction of national narra-
tives is a deeply political process—also 
anchored in history. Founding myths 
and historical watersheds intermingle 
and vie for political salience in this un-
dertaking, in which collective memory 
plays a fundamental role. Without col-
lective memory both the solidarity 
anchored in the past and the notion 
of a common future that imbues the 
state with a sense of purpose would 
not coalesce to form the identity any 
collectivity needs to function (Krato-
chwil 2008, 455; Abdelal et al. 2006, 
699). Traumatic events, such as civil 
wars, genocide or foreign invasions, 
are particularly salient in this respect. 
They create a culture of memory that 
survives in the collective imaginary and 
oftentimes institutionalises it.3
Relatedly, collective memories are 
instrumental in limiting the range of 
what is politically feasible by creating 
taboos. Accordingly, the more hege-
monic the collective memory on a his-
torical event becomes, that is, the clos-
est it is identified with the orthodoxy, 
the more discursive power it enjoys in 
shaping the interests and identities of 
society. That is why the construction 
of a national narrative is actually a po-
litical process (Langenbacher 2010, 13, 
27, 32-33; Fossaert in Gall 2004, 223).
3 As in Mexico’s National Museum of In-
terventions.
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Nationalism is a particularly salient 
identity of nation-states. It is in part the 
product of cultural innovations—a fact 
that is often neglected in international 
relations literature (Cf. Waltz 1979. 
Breuilly 1985, 67). In the case at hand, 
the brand of nationalism that came out 
of Mexico’s Revolution was the direct 
effect of the new concept of collectivity 
produced by the armed conflict. It was 
only at this point that Mexico started to 
posses and display both national coher-
ence as well as a distinct identity in the 
international system. It is important to 
note the continuum between the domes-
tic and the international components 
on identity: it was only by virtue of the 
internal coherence as expressed in the 
new, post-revolutionary identity that 
Mexico’s relationship with the United 
States would radically change (Kowert 
2007, 1, 6-7). The two facets of this 
identity were a new nationhood—the 
domestic, purposive content of revolu-
tionary nationalism—and a new state-
hood—the new conception of state 
sovereignty contained in revolutionary 
nationalism and projected internation-
ally—particularly in the security arena, 
as discussed below (Jepperson et al. 
1996, 59).4
4 Although national identity and state iden-
tity can be analytically separated, and in 
some cases it is useful to do so, both terms 
are used interchangeably. See Jefferson 
1996; Fearon 1999. James D. Fearon, 
«What is identity (as we now use the 
word)?», (1999).
Revolutionary nationalism 
as state identity
As noted, Mexico’s foreign policy 
doctrine, its practice, and the way the 
country understood and approached 
the United States since the early 1920’s 
are the direct outcome of the Revo-
lution and, more specifically, of the 
identity it produced: revolutionary 
nationalism. 
With the armed struggle as the 
‘touchstone of national identity’, 
revolutionary nationalism became the 
discourse that more fully articulated the 
new national project (Comisión para 
el futuro de las relaciones Mexico-Es-
tados Unidos, 1988, 15). Basically, the 
revolutionary myth was about the idea 
that state sovereignty was coterminous 
with a powerful state, one capable of 
delivering on the promises contained in 
the 1917 Constitution (Knight 2009, 
228; Erfani 1995, 58). Along with the 
myth of the Revolution emerged a new 
understanding of the nation—as well as 
a more inclusive and forceful national 
identity (Lopez 2010, 14, 2). It was 
precisely this new identity that served 
as the basis of the new nationalism.
In the domestic realm the char-
acter of the new state included both 
material and ideational factors. Thus, 
key elements were control of natural 
resources and nationalisations, but 
also exaltation of national identity, 
particularly of its indigenous compo-
nent (Bartra 1989, 199). In the external 
realm, revolutionary nationalism meant 
distrust of great powers—particularly 
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of the northern neighbour. This was so 
for historical reasons, particularly the 
memory of Mexico’s dismemberment 
by the United States (Zorrilla 1965, 
508; Ojeda 2006, 111). But there was 
also a forward-looking factor at work: 
the need to preserve the country’s 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis its northern 
neighbour (Meyer 2000, 911). In this 
regard, a significant resource was the 
cultural revolution that took place 
during the revolutionary phase (1910-
1920) and its aftermath; as Alan Knight 
has noted, it ‘allowed Mexico to form 
a national identity [and] gave Mexico 
the necessary discursive tools to resist 
US cultural hegemony’(Knight 2000, 
45; see also Monsiváis, 1976, 1382).5 
This new identity meant a relatively 
stable—if malleable over time—un-
derstanding of both Mexico as a na-
tion and the country’s most important 
interlocutor: the United States. With 
the historical memory and the intent to 
preserve Mexico’s values and interests, 
the post-revolutionary regime’s foreign 
policy doctrine factored in the presence 
5 Thus, for instance, in 1972 President 
Echeverría noted that Mexico «struggles 
to affirm its identity,» and the following 
year reiterated that, in relations with the 
United States, «we aim to preserve our 
sovereignty and increase our cultural 
personality over any other achievement of 
material reward» (Tello 1975,22, 256.).Si-
milarly, de la Madrid’s Foreign Minister 
Bernardo Sepúlveda later commented on 
the country’s need of «reaffirming [its] 
autonomy, identity and personality» for 
which foreign policy was instrumental 
(Sepúlveda 1994,39; Knight 2000, 45). see 
also Monsiváis 1976, 1382).
of the United States across the northern 
border. Having a neighbour that de-
clared its own right of tutelage over the 
entire western hemisphere was indeed 
an effective incentive to formulate a 
defensive foreign policy doctrine, one 
that emphasised political independence 
in the international arena (Sepúlveda 
Amor, 1994, 18 and 37; Ojeda 2006, 
126-127).
The new national identity contained 
a renewed sense of purpose and an in-
novative national project. revolution-
ary-nationalism became ‘the paraph-
rasis of the Monroe doctrine: Mexico 
for the Mexicans’(Herrera-Lasso and 
Tello-Peón 2011, 271). But there was 
more. The revalorisation of the Indian 
component of the nation meant that the 
country assumed itself as a backward 
society. This self-understanding would 
profoundly shape the path Mexico 
would follow both in domestic and 
international affairs. In the former, 
for instance, with the state’s support 
of a land tenure system that suppos-
edly corresponded to pre-colonial 
traditions, and in the latter with the 
often hermit-like position the country 
would assume in the international scene 
(Lomnitz 2010; Bartra 1991, 2; Ojeda 
1966, 128).
The new identity also had a substan-
tial effect on the security apparatus and 
on the country’s international practice 
on diplomatic affairs in general and se-
curity matters in particular. The armed 
forces that emerged from the internecine 
war not only became an integral part 
of the new state: they also adopted 
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Revolutionary Nationalism as their own 
identity and discourse. Thus, military 
doctrine was from early on imbued with 
both a mythical narrative of the revolu-
tion and deep suspicion of the United 
States (Downie 2011, 7). Accordingly, 
in the decades following the revolution 
Mexico adopted largely introspective 
grand strategy and national security 
doctrines. It appeared that only the most 
salient incentives offered by the inter-
national state system were not rejected 
by the post-revolutionary leadership in 
its approach of scant involvement in 
international security affairs. The ob-
jective was not autarky, but rather the 
buttressing of the new state. This in turn 
would contribute to strengthen Mexico’s 
position on security affairs vis-à-vis the 
United States. As Miguel Alemán noted 
in his acceptance speech as the governing 
party’s presidential candidate in 1946, 
Mexico had won ‘a place of honor in the 
concert of nations’ thanks to the achieve-
ments of the post-revolutionary regime, 
as reflected in its diplomatic practice (El 
Informador 1946). Four decades later, 
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1988) referred to Mexico’s foreign 
doctrine as ‘synthesis and instrument of 
our Revolutionary Nationalism (Con-
cepción Montiel 2006, 306).
Revolutionary nationalism, how-
ever, included a principled component 
that set the stage for collaboration on 
security affairs with the United States: 
the Western Hemisphere Idea (WHI) 
(Whitaker 1954; Santa Cruz, 2005). 
The WHI refers the New World’s 
normative structure; first stated in the 
early nineteenth century by Thomas 
Jefferson in his farewell address, it sets 
the countries of the western hemisphere 
apart from European ones. The WHI 
is imbued with a set of principles, such 
as the representative form of govern-
ment of its constitutive units, non-
interference in the domestic affairs of 
states, and a purported community of 
interests among its members. Thus, for 
instance, when the Monroe Doctrine 
was proclaimed in 1823, Mexican 
President Guadalupe Victoria con-
sidered it a ‘memorable promise’ on 
Washington’s part(Victoria 1986, 299). 
Along the same lines, more than a cen-
tury later President Alemán referred 
to the United States as a ‘strong and 
prosperous’ country that struggled with 
the ‘immense responsibilities’ it had to 
bear ‘under the moral sign of democ-
racy’ (Archivo Histórico Diplomático 
1947). Thus, Mexico came to recognise 
some fundamental US interests and 
its regional ascendancy, as well as the 
complementarity of interests between 
the two countries in some issue areas. 
Revolutionary nationalism, however, 
precluded open (and systematic) recog-
nition of this fact. That is why there was 
no talk of any sort of common iden-
tity between the two countries, or of 
Mexico receiving a different treatment 
from its northern neighbour. If there 
has been a special relationship between 
Mexico and the United States, as many 
authors argue, it has been one that has 
not dared speak its name—for identity 
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reasons6. Mexico thus kept a nationalist 
discourse, a formally democratic re-
gime, and a mostly independent foreign 
policy, while guaranteeing the United 
States a stable and non-communist 
neighbour7.
World War II
Mexico’s partnership with the Unit-
ed States during WWII evinces both the 
normative underpinnings of the WHI as 
well as the importance of Revolution-
ary Nationalism as state identity. By the 
late 1930s and early 1940s there was 
no popular or elite perception that the 
war represented an existential threat 
to Mexico. However, the country’s 
leadership was well aware that the new 
international conflict meant not only 
a first-order menace to Washington 
but also to the hemisphere’s values. 
Furthermore, the Mexican government 
saw in WWII a good opportunity to 
link its cooperation to outstanding 
issues in the bilateral agenda, such as 
debt and oil expropriation settlements 
(Torres 1979 24, 32, 37). Thus, the 
administrations of presidents Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940) and Manuel 
6 Bow, Brian and Arturo Santa Cruz. 
«Power, Identity and Special Relationship: 
The  US-Canada and US-Mexico 
Re la t ionsh ips  in  His tor ica l  and 
Comparative Perspective». Paper prepared 
of the 2010 American Political Science 
Association meeting. Washington, D.C., 
September 2-5.
7 Santa Cruz, Arturo (2012). Mexico-
United State Relations: The Semantics of 
Sovereignty. New York, Routledge.
Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) struggled 
against the deep-rooted popular anti-
Americanism—which in this context 
was mixed with widespread sympathy 
for Germany, considered the under-
dog—in order to get support for siding 
with United States in the war’s effort 
(Zorrilla 1965, 485, Torres 1979, 65).
It was clear that on this juncture 
both interests and values of Mexico and 
the United States converged(Velasco 
Márquez 2006, 92). Tellingly, however, 
Mexican authorities chose to emphasise 
the partnership in terms of the defence 
of the broader, hemispheric realm—
not so much as a joint Mexico-United 
States endeavour. This of course had 
to do with the just-mentioned perva-
sive anti-American feeling. Thus, in 
the Summer of 1941 President Ávila 
Camacho (1940-1946) explained to the 
Mexican people:
it would be wrong to think that in 
the current state of affairs, the destiny 
of one of the American nations could 
be indefinitely isolated from  that of 
the rest. Geographically, historically 
and logically we all constitute a demo-
cratic unit that dictatorial forces will 
attempt, no doubt, to disarticulate in 
order to obtain a victory that  in the 
short or medium run would imply the 
disappearance of the principles on 
which rests our existence as sovereign 
and free peoples (Torres 1979, 71-72).
Later that same year Mexico’s am-
bassador to Washington was at pains 
to point out that Mexico’s cooperation 
with its northern neighbour had as its 
ultimate objective ‘the defense of the 
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American Continent’(Mexico-United 
States 1941, 201). Similarly, in 1942 
Foreign Affairs Minister Ezequiel Pa-
dilla rejected the involvement of US 
army personnel in defending Mexican 
facilities, as ‘it could have extremely 
unfavourable political and moral effects 
in Mexico’s army and population at 
large.’(Security.  FF17B 1942, 2). And 
still three years later, when honouring 
the members of the air 201st Fighter 
Squadron on their return from the Pa-
cific front, where they had seen combat 
under the command of US General 
Mac Arthur, the Mexican representa-
tive emphasised their contribution to 
the independence and freedom of the 
western hemisphere, ‘from Alaska to 
Cape Horn.’8
However, cooperation on security 
matters took place fundamentally at 
the bilateral, Mexico-U.S. level. Thus, 
in July 1941, both countries subscribed 
an agreement by which Mexico ac-
cepted the prohibition of exporting 
strategic materials, and some months 
later it signed the Convention on Claims 
Settlements, with which it paid back the 
debt owed due to land expropriation. As 
President Ávila Camacho stated when 
the U.S. participation in WWII was im-
manent: ‘In the difficulties of coming 
days, the United States may be assured 
8 In contrast, the congratulatory notes to 
the Mexican squadron from President 
Truman, Chief of Staff of the Army Mar-
shall, and Supreme Commander of the 
Southwest Pacific Area Mac Arthur all 
explicitly refer to the joint US-Mexican 
effort (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, 
1979).
of the sincerity of our solidarity’(Archivo 
Histórico Diplomático 1941).So, in 
February 1942 the Joint Mexico-United 
States Defense Commission, among 
whose objectives were the elaboration 
of plans ‘for the defense of Mexico and 
adjacent areas of the United States’, was 
formed (Historic Diplomatic Archives 
1942; Woolley and Peters n.d.).
While the Mexican contribution 
to the war effort would be largely 
symbolic—only the above-mentioned 
squadron saw action—the decision 
by Ávila Camacho’s government held 
great political value. Mexico had 
indeed become strategic in US policy 
and its attitude only helped to ce-
ment the WHI(Haglund 1984). As the 
Mexican ambassador in Washington, 
Francisco Castillo Nájera, would say: 
‘The most significant part of the role 
played by Mexico in the war is that 
for the first time in history Mexico is 
united in objectives and ideals with 
the U.S.’(Diplomatic Historical Ar-
chive n.d). During the war Mexico did 
allow the United States access to its 
ports (maritime and air), as well as the 
construction of radar stations(Benítez 
Manaut 1998, 63 and 64; González and 
Haggard 1998, 306). Thus, by the war’s 
end it had become clear that, when push 
comes to shove, Mexico was willing 
to collaborate with the United States 
(Zorilla 1965, 508).
As the Cold War became more stable 
and the economies of both countries 
increasingly integrated, it became obvi-
ous that a harmonious relationship was 
in the interests of both nations. The 
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collaborative military aspect, however, 
would end with the war (Cope 1997, 
239; Torres 1979, 150). Thus, in 1948, 
when the urgency of obtaining training 
camps for the US Marines had passed, 
Mexico revoked the permission it had 
granted the U.S. in September  1943 (U. 
S. Department of State 1972, 645).Along 
the same lines, Mexico was far from 
being an enthusiastic promoter of the 
1948 Inter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance, because it was considered 
an instrument for US power. Mexican 
leaders argued in Washington that their 
country was ‘different from other Latin 
American countries’—and that it must re-
fuse to contribute armed forces in defence 
of the hemisphere(U. S. Department of 
State 1983, 1327).9 By the mid 1940s the 
military establishment in the U.S. came 
to accept the idea of ‘Mexican isolation-
ism’—thus confirming what seemed, if 
not an unspoken special relationship, at 
least a tacit agreement (Paz 1998, 231). In 
general, Mexico´s stance in international 
affairs during the Cold War was, in the 
words of one of the practitioners, ‘one 
of mistrust and partial disinterest, and 
its foreign policy is mostly defensive and 
anti-interventionist’(Castañeda 1969, 
155).10
9 This did not mean, of course, that all 
military cooperation ceased; in early 1960 
there was already a discrete but growing 
training programme in effect for Mexican 
military members in the U.S. (Archives of 
the State Department 1961b, 3).
10 As John Cope would note: «U.S.-Mexico 
relations in defense issues have followed 
different rules and methods compared to 
those of Washington and Ottawa or those 
Indeed, a declassified document the 
US embassy in Mexico sent in February 
1961 to the State Department noted 
with some resignation: ‘by remain-
ing cool to the U.S. responsibilities in 
the prolonged crisis of the Cold War, 
Mexico feels pride in its sovereign 
independence’(Archives of the State 
Department 1961a, 6).Even after the 
North American Free Trade Agree-
ment came into effect in 1994, when 
it had become clear that unipolarity 
was clearly not a fleeting moment in 
world politics, Mexico did not sub-
stantially change its foreign or security 
policies (Curzio 2007, 112). As Mi-
chael Dziedzic pointed out at the time: 
‘defense policy in Mexico responds 
principally to domestic stimuli… While 
global order has undergone a thorough 
retrofit, the country’s defense policy has 
not’ (Dziedzic 1994, 110).
Communism-Cuba
For Mexico the relationship with 
Communist Cuba was part of a tri-
angle. One vertex represented the non-
intervention principle: revolutionary 
nationalism dictated that Tlatelolco 
take a maximalist stand regarding the 
right of Havana on domestic affairs; 
the second had to do with the country’s 
relationship with the United States: for 
both normative and pragmatic reasons, 
Mexico City could not antagonise 
Washington on such a fundamental 
of Washington and the rest of Latin Ame-
rica» (Cope 1997, 235). 
94
Estudios Internacionales 178 (2014) • Universidad de Chile
matter as the alleged struggle against 
Communism in the hemisphere; finally, 
the third vertex referred to the post-
revolutionary regime’s own interests: 
keeping a check on Cuban activities 
in the country would avoid potential 
political instability. As suggested, 
post-revolutionary Mexico held a mu-
tually beneficial—if only tacit—agree-
ment with its northern neighbour: in 
exchange for its right to dissent on 
secondary issues, Mexico would assist 
their powerful neighbour in fundamen-
tal matters (Ojeda 2006, 120). Thus, in 
1955 President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 
(1952-1958) let the US ambassador 
know that if the Communists lead 
the US government into a confronta-
tion, Mexico would be ‘definitely’ on 
Washington’s side(State Department 
Archives 1955, 2). Again, in March 
of the following year, the Mexican 
president informed President Dwight 
Eisenhower that he agreed with him 
in that Soviet embassies were centres 
of subversion and spying, and should 
therefore be under surveillance; indeed, 
his administration already practiced 
such measures, for domestic and inter-
national reasonsArchives of the U.S. 
State Department 1956, 3).
Similarly, and returning to the 
Cuba-Mexico.U.S. triangle, a few 
weeks before the 1962 VIII Meeting 
of Consultation of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) Foreign 
Ministers held in Punta del Este (in 
which Mexico cast the only dissent-
ing vote on the issue of expelling 
Cuba from the regional organisation), 
President Adolfo López Mateos told 
US Ambassador Thomas Mann that 
he personally did not sympathise at 
all with the Castro regime but that 
the defence of the non-intervention 
principle was paramount (Rojas y Co-
varrubias 2011, 138-139). As Mexican 
diplomats had informed their US coun-
terparts the year after the triumphant 
entry of the rebels in Havana, Mexico 
was even more concerned than they 
were about the increase of Soviet influ-
ence in Cuba (New York Times 1960). 
Less noted than its voting position at 
Punta del Este, though, is Mexico’s 
Foreign Affairs Minister’s speech at the 
session, which is profoundly revealing 
of Mexico’s appraisal of Communist 
Cuba. It is worth quoting a couple of 
paragraphs at length:
For the first time in the history of 
the Americas, one of our governments 
clearly declares that it upholds an 
ideology and a political system that is 
totally divorced from the policies that 
have been the common denominator 
of institutions of all peoples of the 
New World. Even if, on more than one 
occasion, some of our governments 
were not faithful to the principles 
and the norms of representative de-
mocracy, never had any of them had 
declared to uphold a different political 
philosophy.
It thus seems unquestionable that 
there is a radical incompatibility be-
tween belonging to the Organization 
of American States and upholding a 
Marxist-Leninist political creed, as 
it would also be with the upholding 
of an absolutist monarchical one. 
With the same energy with which we 
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defend the non-intervention principle 
for all the peoples, and therefore that 
of the Cuban people, we assert that 
being a member of our organization 
is incompatible with the adoption of a 
governmental regime whose character-
istics are not the ones of representative 
democracies(Manuel Tello in Rojas 
and Covarrubias 2011, 140).
Thus, at a Summit meeting held in 
July 1962 by presidents Kennedy and 
López Mateos, ambassador Manuel 
Tello noted that his country had been 
the first one to openly adhere to the 
doctrine regarding the incompatibility 
of the Cuban political regime and the 
Inter-American system (Archives of the 
Department of the State 1962). In the 
accompanying communiqué issued at 
the end of the summit, referring to both 
Cuba and the Soviet Union, both lead-
ers stated their commitment ‘To oppose 
totalitarian institutions and activities 
which are incompatible with the demo-
cratic principles they uphold’(New 
York Times 1962).
A couple of years later President 
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) 
would reiterate his government’s 
alignment with Washington. During 
a meeting with President Lyndon B. 
Johnson at his ranch in Texas, the 
Mexican dignitary assured his counter-
part that he ‘could be absolutely sure 
that when the chips were really down, 
Mexico would be unequivocally by its 
side’(LBJ Library Archives 1964a, 3). 
Díaz Ordaz articulated what had been 
only a tacit agreement: ‘There was a 
considerable advantage when the is-
sues at stake were not great if Mexico 
could continue to demonstrate its 
political independence and divergence 
on relatively minor issues’ (The Nixon 
Tapes N.D.).
An affinity was found between the 
U.S. and Mexico regarding socialism in 
the hemisphere, attended by close col-
laboration. Consequently, in 1964  Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk would point 
out that Mexico had helped the U.S to 
control Castro, although the country 
was very ‘sensitive’ about publicity 
regarding such cooperation(National 
Security Archive 1964, 21). Mexico also 
restricted travel to the island—some-
thing the U.S. appreciated (LBJ Library 
Archives 1964b). Collaboration was 
not limited to such restrictions, but also 
included, for instance, photographing 
each traveller arriving from Cuba (State 
Department Archives 1965).
Maintenance of relations between 
Mexico and Cuba obeyed in part to an 
informal agreement with Washington 
regarding the advisability of having 
a member of the OAS with a ‘foot in 
the door’ that could be useful to US 
interests (National Security Archive 
1967, 14).Thus, in 1967 the Mexican 
ambassador to Cuba, Miguel Covián 
Perez, agreed to provide the US embassy 
in Mexico with information regard-
ing relevant matters, not only via the 
Mexican ambassador Antonio Carrillo 
Flores, but also via ‘informal and unof-
ficial contacts’ (The Nixon Tapes). As 
a former US national security advisor 
would say, ‘the rule [between the United 
States and Mexico] was, «you have 
96
Estudios Internacionales 178 (2014) • Universidad de Chile
diplomatic relationships with Cuba, but 
you let us crack everything the Cubans 
do in Mexico»’(Interview with Pastor 
2008).
However, as suggested, beyond 
cooperation with its the powerful 
northern neighbour, the Mexican gov-
ernment had its own reasons to play 
a double game in its relations with 
Cuba. As  Covián Pérez’s predecessor 
in Havana wrote to Secretary Carrillo 
Flores: ‘Commander Raul Castro has 
always supported the activities guer-
rilla groups operate in Central and 
South America’(Historic Diplomatic 
Archives 1967). Even the apparently 
anti-American President Luis Echever-
ría (1970-1976) was aware of the im-
portance of Mexico’s double game in its 
relations with Havana.11 For example, 
in a meeting with Richard Nixon, he ex-
plained beforehand the meaning of the 
speech he would deliver at the United 
Nations: it was necessary to ratify the 
Mexican position regarding the role of 
11 According to the Washington Post journa-
list Jefferson Morley in his book about 
Winston Scott, who headed CIA opera-
tions in Mexico from 1956 to 1969, López 
Mateos, Díaz Ordaz, and Echeverría co-
llaborated with the agency—before taking 
office as presidents—fundamentally sha-
ring information on Cuba as agents on 
hire. (cf. Morley 2008)). In an interview 
with the State Department historian, Marc 
Susser, and his two Mexico specialists, 
Halbert Jones and Douglas Kraft, carried 
out on 4 Aug. 2008 in Washington, the 
author asked about the veracity of 
Morley’s information; the answer obtai-
ned was that they could neither deny nor 
confirm it.
the Third World, since unless I carry 
the flag in Latin America,  Castro Ruz 
will capture it’. President Echeverría 
clarified that for Mexico ‘Cuba is a 
Soviet base in every sense of the term, 
military and ideological, and we have 
it just under our nose,’ and that his na-
tion’s aim was to ‘contribute, more than 
any other Latin American country, to 
taking the flag of progress out of their 
hands’(National Security Archive1972). 
As Mexico’s post-revolutionary identity 
demanded, the three vertexes of the 
triangle Communist Cuba represented 
to the country were kept in balance.
Drug Trafficking
Although drug smuggling from 
Mexico to the United States had been a 
contentious issue since the 1920s, until 
the mid-1980s  it had been managed in 
a relatively successful and cooperative 
fashion.12 But the situation changed 
around that time. As a result of the clo-
sure of the Caribbean routes of cocaine 
traffickers from Colombia to the U.S. 
in the early 1980s, Mexico turned into 
a drug corridor. This phenomenon pro-
voked a series of changes in the modus 
vivendi of those involved in the world 
of drugs in Mexico. Drug lords began 
dividing up the country into zones of 
control, which no longer followed the 
12  As former Mexican Foreign Affairs Mi-
nister Bernardo Sepúlveda would note, 
drug smuggling did not use to be a foreign 
policy or national security matter (Sepúl-
veda Amor 1994)
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terms of the tacit understanding that 
had prevailed for decades between them 
and Mexican authorities. By the mid-
eighties Mexico was a principal suppli-
er of drugs in the United States: it held 
about 40 per cent of the heroin market 
and 30 per cent of marijuana(Serrano 
2007, 268). From Washington’s point 
of view, the situation was to be blamed 
on Mexico’s feeble commitment to the 
fight against drugs.
Further aggravating the situation, 
in February 1985 DEA agent Enrique 
Camarena Salazar, was kidnapped and 
later murdered in Guadalajara. Ca-
marena ran Operation Padrino, a joint 
operative whose goal was arresting 
heroin and cocaine traffickers. The ad-
ministration of President de la Madrid’s 
was surprised by the event and reacted 
in an inconvenient manner—which was 
taken by the US government as evidence 
of the indolence and corruption of 
Mexican officials (Castañeda y Pastor 
1989, 333). Secretary of State George 
Shultz declared: ‘Our level of tolerance 
has been exceeded by these events, and 
they [Mexican officials] know that’ 
(New York Times 1985).
As a result of this unfortunate inci-
dent, Washington hardened its position 
on the drug war and in its dealings 
with Mexico. Initially, Camarena’s 
murder resulted in the DEA’s Operation 
Legend, aimed at bringing before US 
courts those believed responsible for 
Camarena’s murder (Toro 1998, 335). 
In addition, in 1986 the Law Against 
Drug Abuse was passed, and included 
punitive measures against Mexico, 
such as the withdrawal of resources 
(a million dollars of assistance in the 
drug war) if Mexico did not provide 
information on the progress of the Ca-
marena murder case(Treverton 1989, 
277). That same year the US Congress 
institutionalised the annual certification 
process on cooperation in the combat 
against drug trade, applied to coun-
tries working with the United States. 
Countries found to be, according to 
reports received by the US President, 
participating in the production or 
traffic of drugs, would not be certi-
fied and would be sanctioned by, for 
example, the suspension of assistance 
via US programmes. Moreover, one 
measure that was apparently domesti-
cally  oriented, contributed to further 
complicate bilateral relations: National 
Security Directive 221, adopted in April 
of 1986 by President Ronald Reagan, 
considered drug trade to be a threat to 
national security(Ruiz-Cabañas 1998, 
111 and 112). The implication was 
clear: Mexico, as a source of narcotics, 
became a threat to US national security. 
The signals being sent by Washington 
were far from flattering: in 1988, for ex-
ample, the Department of State would 
point out in its report to Congress that 
‘the corruption in higher levels of the 
Mexican government continues to be 
the most serious obstacle to effective 
cooperation with Mexico regarding 
drug trade’ (In Castañeda and Pastor 
1989, 336; El Universal 2000).
Mexico reacted accordingly. In 
1987 the de la Madrid administration 
defined drug trafficking as a ‘state mat-
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ter’ that constituted a national security 
threat. Similarly, Carlos Salinas’s (1988-
1994) and Ernesto Zedillo’s (1994-
2000) administrations considered 
drug smuggling a menace to national 
security(Ruíz-Cabañas 1998). The lat-
ter went further than the others in that 
it declared that drug traffic was the 
main threat to Mexican national secu-
rity—and the battle against drug traf-
ficking became part of Mexico’s foreign 
policy(Andreas 1998, 161; Toro 1998, 
16). In 1996 Zedillo’s government 
proposed to that of President William 
Clinton the establishment of a High 
Level Contact Group on the matter 
of drug control (Bárcena Caqui 2003, 
24). In 1997 a joint document, the 
‘U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat 
Assessment’ identified drug traffic as 
a ‘common threat’ and established an 
‘alliance’ to fight against drug use and 
trafficking (González González 2003, 
263). That same year both leaders is-
sued the Presidential Declaration on 
Anti-Drug Cooperation and an extradi-
tion protocol was agreed upon. In 1998 
Mexico and the U.S. adopted a Bilateral 
Strategy for Cooperation against Drugs. 
Beyond documents and pronounce-
ments, bilateral collaboration enjoyed 
its best period in the late 1990s.
However, the deepening of rela-
tions in the struggle against drug trade 
clearly did not lack setbacks. One very 
illustrative case follows: in February 
1997 General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, 
director of the National Institute to 
Combat Drugs, was arrested due to his 
association with the leader of the Juárez 
cartel, Amado Carrillo Fuentes(Schulz 
1997, 18). Gutiérrez Rebollo’s US 
counterpart, anti-drug Czar and also 
(retired) General, Barry McCaffrey, 
had described him as ‘a serious soldier, 
a person of absolute and unquestion-
able integrity’. Just one week before 
he was arrested, the Mexican General 
had visited Washington, where he had 
received a detailed summary of clas-
sified information regarding US anti-
narcotics strategies(Schulz 1997, 18 
and 19).
Another setback in the strength-
ening of bilateral cooperation in the 
struggle against drugs took place a 
year later. In May 1998,  Operation 
Casablanca was uncovered, a US sting, 
which—without the Mexican gov-
ernment’s consent—lasted three and 
half years and employed undercover 
investigation, investigation of money 
laundering in the U.S. and Mexico. The 
initial result of the operation was the 
decommissioning or freezing of US$157 
million, and the arrest of 22 Mexican 
bank officials (Enciso 2009, 235). 
Casablanca was a flagrant violation 
not only of Mexican sovereignty and 
the bilateral agreements shared by the 
two countries, but also of the climate 
of trust that had been established by 
both countries’ officials. Despite the 
commotion caused by the discovery 
of the Mexican anti-drug Czar’s illicit 
activities and detention, eight months 
later, at a Senate hearing, McCaffrey 
would say: ‘In the last 2 years the level 
of cooperation on the drug issue has 
been phenomenal, to the point that it 
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would clearly… rank as one of the most 
dramatic transformations I have seen in 
the region in the last 30 years’.» (Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 1997).
By now revolutionary nationalism 
as state identity was on its way out. 
Thus, for instance, the Zedillo admin-
istration’s six-year plan did not even 
mention either it or the 1910 Revolu-
tion, as had been ordinarily been done 
since the 1930s. There were, however, 
a few references to Mexican national-
ism as a living force in Zedillo’s six-
year plan; it notes, for instance, that 
it «guides our conduct abroad and 
sustains our future.» (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal 1995).
Furthrermore, there was a sharp 
discursive break when in 2000 the first 
administration not belonging to the 
party in power since the 1920s took 
office. Thus, going further than his 
predecessor’s the Fox administration’s 
six-year (2000-2006) plan did not 
even mention nationalism; and refers 
only to Mexico’s «national identity 
and culture.» (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 
2007, 26). Regarding the revolution, 
the first president belonging to the 
Conservative National Action Party 
(PAN) would note: «In 2000, at long 
last, we Mexican made the ideals of 
the revolutionary movement effective 
and used our vote as the best weapon 
to get rid of the authoritarian regime. 
(Fox 2006)». Similarly, the six year-
plan of the second PAN government, 
that of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), 
pretty much ignored revolutionary na-
tionalism as national identity. Instead, 
it emphasized that «Mexicans should 
make of pluralism our greatest strength 
and unite our wills and efforts to make 
those aspirations which make us agree 
and give us identity as a nation come 
true» (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2007, 
313). There was thus a clear break 
from past discourse regarding the un-
derstanding of state identity.
Interestingly, the anti-drug struggle 
played a less predominant role in 
Mexico’s relationship with the United 
States at the turn of the century. Dur-
ing Fox’s government cooperation on 
anti-narcotic matters with Washington 
continued, but in a less ambitious man-
ner. Furthermore, a qualitative change 
was not pursued, as did occur with the 
intensification of the North American 
general integration project as enshrined 
in Fox’s NAFTA-Plus proposal, or with 
the specific issue of comprehensive mi-
gratory reform—the ‘whole enchilada’. 
The agenda was indeed dominated by 
the search for a migration agreement 
September 11th, 2001. Since that day´s 
lethal events, security matters as defined 
by Washington would occupy centre 
stage. It may be said that since then, an-
ti-drug cooperation, while continuing 
to grow, was no longer a priority, nor 
was it one where great efficiencies were 
gained. During the Fox’s administration 
the High Level Contact Group was 
not convened.13A 2004 report by the 
13 The final meeting for this group was held 
in Aug. 2000—at which, incidentally, the 
members called for continuity for the 
group during future administrations. The 
High Level Contact Group was replaced 
100
Estudios Internacionales 178 (2014) • Universidad de Chile
Congressional Research Service noted 
that the results from the cooperation 
between George W. Bush’s and Fox’s 
administrations on drug trafficking 
matters were mixed (Storrs 2004, 3).
During this period, war between 
drug cartels became more aggressive 
as they struggled to control different 
geographic areas. The increased level of 
aggression moved Washington to focus 
once more on the drug trade problem 
in Mexico. Thus, following a wave 
of violence on the border, in January 
2005 the State Department warned 
US citizens about the ‘serious security 
situation in Mexico’; simultaneously, 
ambassador Tony Garza wrote to 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Luis Ernesto 
Derbez, and Attorney General, Rafael 
Macedo,  expressing his concern re-
garding the ‘incapacity’ of Mexican law 
enforcement forces to control violence 
associated with drug trade (La Jornada 
2005a).The Mexican government took 
this criticism as interference in domestic 
affairs, and the Office of the President 
made certain clarifications, including 
the mandatory one, i.e.: that the ‘Mexi-
can government does not allow any 
judgment or assessment from  external 
governments regarding policy actions 
aimed at addressing its own problems’ 
(La Jornada 2005b).
Beyond diplomatic frictions, the fact 
is that when President Calderón took 
office, drug trafficking—and organised 
crime more broadly—represented a 
in 2002 by the Anti-Narcotic Cooperation 
and Justice Group, but the latter did not 
have the same influence as the former.
serious threat to Mexico. As president 
elect, in a tone which recalled that of 
former President Zedillo, Calderón 
started by saying that drug trade was 
probably the country’s greatest threat’ 
(La Jornada 2006). After only ten days 
in office, President Calderón openly 
declared war on drug-traffickers. After 
initiating military operations in six 
states,  Attorney General Eduardo Me-
dina Mora explained that this was the 
new government’s answer to ‘a severe 
problem of risk of loss of sovereignty’ 
(La Jornada 2007a).Thus, during the 
first year of Calderon’s administration 
the budget earmarked to fighting drug 
lords not only increased substantially 
(by 24 per cent compared to the last 
year of Fox’s administration), (Inicia-
tiva Mérida 2007, 2) but also—and this 
is undoubtedly more consequential—
the army was involved to an unprec-
edented level in the ‘crusade’ against 
drug traffic. In the first week of 2007 
federal armed forces were sent to the 
states of Baja California, Michoacán, 
and Sinaloa; with the expansion of 
these operations, the federal govern-
ment embarked on what it would call 
the National Crusade against Delin-
quency, whose goal was, according to 
the president, to win the ‘war’ against 
organised crime (La Jornada 2007b 
and 2007c).
It was precisely this alarming situ-
ation that allowed intensifying coop-
eration in the fight against drug traffic 
with the U.S. In the context of a visit 
from President Bush to the region in 
March of 2007, a summit meeting 
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was held in Mérida where the need to 
strengthen cooperation on these mat-
ters was discussed. The outcome of 
that process was the Mérida Initiative, 
announced by President Bush seven 
months later. The new framework for 
cooperation sought to strengthen the 
efforts in justice administration and 
law enforcement in both countries, as 
well as increasing bilateral cooperation. 
It should be noted that the tripartite 
structure (what each part should do in 
its jurisdiction, plus the bilateral activi-
ties) of this initiative was proposed by 
Mexico (Rico 2008, 11). For Foreign 
Affairs Ministry’s Alejandro Estivill, 
the Mérida Initiative was ‘qualitatively 
different from what we might have 
seen 15 years ago’(Interview with 
Estivil 2008). Effectively, the strategy 
included a multi-annual request by the 
Bush government to the US Congress, 
of US$1,400 million. For former Un-
dersecretary of Hemispheric Affairs 
Thomas Shannon, the inclusion of 
financial resources, although marginal 
in terms of the relative costs that the 
Mexican government has taken on, 
is symbolically important considering 
that ‘resources are the manifestation 
of commitment’(Interview with Shan-
non 2008).
The aid focused on both the fight 
against drug trafficking as well as the 
strengthening of the justice system. The 
largest portion of the approved trans-
fers consisted in equipment and techni-
cal cooperation for anti-drug trafficking 
pursuits, and while the cost of these is 
only a fraction (less than 10 percent) of 
what the Mexican government lays out 
annually in the fight against drug traffic, 
it is symbolic of the new concentration 
on joint cooperation, since the amount 
contributed during the first year, for 
example, is greater than that of the 
previous 12 years as a whole (Woodrow 
Wilson International Center 2009, 13).
But what really reveals the new per-
spective is the fact that for the first time 
Washington envisaged this problem in 
terms of co-responsibility; that is, there 
was an evident recognition—far more 
specific than heretofore- that the U.S. 
is part of the problem. This recognition 
appears mainly in one of the three com-
ponents mentioned from the Initiative: 
the point related to the strengthening of 
justice administration and law enforce-
ment in the U.S. The objective was, as 
stated by the Department of State’s, 
Jacobson, ‘to strengthen institutions on 
both sides of theborder’(Cuellar et al. 
2008, 4). Thus, Washington is commit-
ted to increase its efforts to remove one 
of the principal obstacles the country 
has had to face in the war against drug 
trafficking, according to the Mexican 
government: the transfer of arms 
which reach the drug cartels (around 
90 per cent of arms confiscated from 
them originate in the U.S.) (Woodrow 
Wilson International Center 2009, 16). 
As Undersecretary Shannon recognised: 
‘We understand that while drugs move 
north, weapons and laundered cur-
rency move south, and that part of our 
southwest border strategy cannot just 
be fending off drugs as they’re coming 
to the United States, that it has to be 
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interdicting weapons and both cur-
rency as they move south’(Interview 
with Shannon 2008).Thus, in 2009 the 
US government presented the National 
Southwest Border Counternarcotics 
Strategy, which included a chapter on 
arms transfers(GAO 2009, 1).
In the context of preparing for the 
first visit of President Barack Obama in 
April 2009, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton would make a significant recog-
nition which reflected the new status of 
anti-drug trafficking cooperation: ‘Our 
insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels 
the drug trade… our inability to prevent 
weapons from being illegally smuggled 
across the border to arm those criminals 
causes the deaths of police officers, 
soldiers, and civilians’(El Universal 
2009). The following month the U.S 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet 
Napolitano, designated Alan Bersin as 
Border Czar—a position Bersin held for 
a second time, as from 1995 to 1998 
he had served as Attorney General for 
the border. One indication  of  changing 
times: while Bersin’s primary concern 
during his first term in this position 
was the question of migration, later 
it would be drug trafficking and arms 
flows. As he would admit, there was a 
‘change of priorities’ (Proceso 2009). 
A sort of ‘Mérida 2.0’ or ‘Beyond 
Mérida’ approach got in the works in 
2010, and continued into Enrique Peña 
Nieto’s administration (2012-2018; 
more that US$300 million in 2011 and 
almost US$300 million in 2012 in the 
US budget were laid out for the new 
programme, whereas the Obama ad-
ministration requested US$234 million 
for 2013) (Interview with Feeley 2010; 
Seelke 2011; Reforma 2012).
What is perhaps more significant 
about the Mérida Initiative—regardless 
of the rationale for its creation or its 
actual impact—is the increased contact 
between intelligence and military ser-
vices of Mexico and the United States it 
originated. As Defence Secretary Robert 
Gates noted in March 2009, ‘I think we 
are beginning to be in a position to help 
the Mexicans more than we have in the 
past. Some of the old biases against 
cooperation . . . between our militaries 
. . . are being set aside’ (In Deare 2009, 
1).By 2011, for instance, ‘fusion cells’ 
consisting of D.E.A., C.I.A., and retired 
US officials, working along with Mexi-
can counterparts in Northern Mexico 
and Mexico City, were operating. As 
Eric Olson, noted, ‘this kind of collabo-
ration would have been unthinkable 
five years ago’(New York Times 2011a). 
The change has not been easy for some 
high officials in Mexico, who still feel 
estranged from the northern neighbour. 
As Olson has pointed out, ‘The Mexi-
cans sort of roll their eyes and say we 
know it’s happening, even though it’s 
not supposed to be happening… The 
United States is using tools in a country 
where officials are still uncomfortable 
with those tools’(New York Times 
2011b). It is thus not surprising that a 
tense relationship between American 
law enforcements officials and Mexican 
army personnel still prevails(New York 
Times 2012).
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Indeed, there was some friction 
between the incoming Peña Nieto ad-
ministration and the United States re-
garding the methods US security agen-
cies were using in Mexico, but beyond 
some tactical adjustments (chiefly the 
centralisation of cooperation manage-
ment in the Ministry of the Interior), 
bilateral cooperation on this conten-
tious realm has continued. As Mexico’s 
Attorney General said in a recent visit 
to his counterpart in Washington: ‘The 
bilateral cooperation brought about by 
the Mérida Initiative has been splendid, 
but the enforcement mechanisms need 
to be reviewed’ (El Universal 2013). 
Thus, collaboration has continued. For 
instance, the US Congress appropriated 
funds for the Merida Initiative for the 
2014 fiscal year, and US intelligence 
played an instrumental role in the Feb-
ruary 2014 capture of the most wanted 
Mexican drug lord Joaquín «Chapo» 
Guzmán(Washington Post 2014). Both 
the unprecedented extent of coopera-
tion in this realm of the security rela-
tionship, as well as its open discussion, 
seem to have become a permanent 
feature of Mexico-US relations.
Conclusions
The evolution of the U.S.-Mexico 
security agenda in the last century 
shows light on differences between both 
countries regarding these matters. The 
divide has of evidently been related to 
wider cultural (Anglo America vis-à-vis 
Latin-America) and material (the huge 
power differential between the two 
countries) factors. But I would argue 
that one item in particular goes a long 
way in explaining the traditionally 
distant relationship on security affairs: 
Mexico’s Revolutionary Nationalism 
as state identity. As argued above, the 
post-revolutionary understanding was 
of great significance not only for Mex-
ico’s self-definition, political consolida-
tion, and institutional organisation, but 
for the way it came to perceive world 
affairs—and particularly the United 
States as well.
There was, however, a normative 
structure in the making since the early 
nineteenth century, the Western Hemi-
sphere Idea, which made the common-
ality of values and interests to become 
evident in some particular junctures. 
Thus, in the 1940s (in the context 
of WWII), two decades later (in the 
triangular Cuba-Mexico-U.S. relation-
ship), and since the late 1990s, but par-
ticularly since 2007, in the fight against 
drug trafficking, bilateral cooperation 
on a variety of aspects of the broader 
security agenda has taken place.
After over 100 years since the start 
of the armed conflict from which a new 
state emerged, revolutionary national-
ism as state identity has unfolded to 
the point of it being now pretty much 
gone. Accordingly, not only the change 
in cooperation in discrete security mat-
ters with the United States has become 
more evident, but it would also seem 
that the various components of the 
security agenda had started adding up. 
This has been particularly noticeable 
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in the ongoing cooperation to combat 
drug trafficking, which has had a clear 
spillover effect on the broader security 
agenda. Furthermore, bilateral coopera-
tion on this matter not only points to 
an unintended effect but also shows the 
malleability of issues. That is, partner-
ship on what for Mexico amounted 
still in the mid of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century to a domestic na-
tional security threat—even if many of 
the factors behind it were external—led 
to an unprecedented level of coopera-
tion with Washington on security af-
fairs. At this point, both drug traffick-
ing and security issues more broadly 
defined intermingled, with the former 
moving up (from low to high politics) in 
the bilateral agenda. The irony should 
be evident: the catalyser for bilateral 
cooperation on security matters was an 
issue that threatened Mexico’s internal 
security—the kind of threat the security 
agenda associated with Revolutionary 
Nationalism privileged. However, it 
would seem that with the emergence 
of a more open, plural and democratic 
Mexico, Revolutionary Nationalism 
navel-gazing approach to security af-
fairs has been overcome, and a kind of 
security in parts with the United States 
has emerged.
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